Do protocols reshape markets by enabling multi-vendor competition?
Explores whether technical protocols function as market-shaping mechanisms that can break winner-take-all dynamics. O'Reilly's Model Context Protocol case suggests protocols might redistribute competitive power, but the claim needs empirical testing across multiple markets.
O'Reilly, writing with Ilan Strauss and Sruly Rosenblat as part of their AI Disclosures Project, argues that protocols are not neutral technical plumbing but mechanisms that shape who can compete in a market. He traces the claim through the early AI chatbot market, which he describes as "a winner-takes-all race to be the dominant platform for AI in the way Windows became the platform for PCs, or iOS and Android for phones. Whoever wins controls the market." He then points to Anthropic's introduction of the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as the hinge: "All of a sudden, the landscape looked more like a web. There could be many winners. It didn't matter what model you were running or whose APIs you were calling as long as you followed the protocol." The general claim he draws from this single case: "Protocols are not just technical infrastructure. They are market-shaping mechanisms."
The reasoning runs through two distinctions borrowed from Summer of Protocols writer Venkatesh Rao and Ethereum researcher Danny Ryan. First, a protocol is a "stratum of codified behavior" that becomes invisible once adopted — a "Whitehead advance" after philosopher Alfred North Whitehead's point that civilization advances by extending what people can do without thinking. Second, Rao contrasts a protocol, an "engineered argument," with an API, an "engineered agreement" enforced by one dominant actor — the difference being who holds power over the terms of interaction. O'Reilly folds in a further distinction between de jure protocols that arise from a formal standards process and de facto protocols that arise through market contention; MCP falls in the latter camp, which is part of why he treats disclosures themselves as functional protocols — observability points, like credit-card fraud monitoring or email spam filtering, that make a market's behavior inspectable and therefore governable.
This sits one level above the protocol notes already in the library, which work the formal-design register: Can classical agent architectures fix agentic AI accountability? argues agentic AI needs BDI architectures and formal commitment semantics to become verifiable, and Can agent protocols be efficient, versatile, and portable simultaneously? classifies existing protocols by the versatility-efficiency-portability trade-offs their schemas encode. Both ask what makes a protocol technically sound. O'Reilly's claim is adjacent but different in kind: regardless of its technical design, a protocol's mere existence and adoption can convert a winner-take-all platform race into a multi-vendor web, which is a competition-policy effect, not an engineering one.
The argument is a single-case narrative from a Substack essay, not a peer-reviewed or empirical study, and O'Reilly does not measure market concentration before and after MCP's introduction or rule out other causes of the AI ecosystem's multi-vendor shape (new entrants, falling model costs, open-weight releases). The piece also does not say whether de facto protocol adoption reliably prevents re-concentration — a protocol-following "web" can still produce a dominant hub. The implication it supports is narrower than "protocols democratize markets": that protocol choice is a lever competition-policy thinking should track, worth watching rather than treating as settled.
Inquiring lines that read this note 18
This note is a source for these research framings, grouped by the broader line of inquiry each explores. Scan the bold lines of inquiry; follow any specific question forward.
How can merchant-funded agents remain loyal to consumer interests in digital commerce?- Does infrastructure control over fares shift market power away from airlines?
- What protocol-layer obligations could replace GUI consumer protection rules?
- How does MCP's zero-commission model compare to current OTA commission structures?
- Are merchants actually adopting these protocols as an integrated stack?
- How do formal standards differ from market-driven protocol adoption in governance?
- What makes protocols more market-shaping than APIs enforced by dominant actors?
- Does protocol adoption require formal disclosure mechanisms to remain governable?
- Should merchants adopt new protocols or reuse existing standards instead?
- What incentives push platforms toward closed systems versus open standards?
- Can de facto protocols prevent market re-concentration after initial adoption?
- How should antitrust frameworks address harms that resemble coordination without proving collusion?
- How does pre-commitment power reshape what algorithms can achieve in two-sided markets?
- How do antitrust frameworks need to change to address tacit algorithmic collusion?
Related concepts in this collection 5
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Can classical agent architectures fix agentic AI accountability?
Could AAMAS concepts like BDI models and formal protocols address the transparency and verifiability gaps in current LLM-based agents? This explores whether decades-old multi-agent theory offers practical scaffolding for trustworthy autonomous systems.
both treat protocols as the fix for agentic AI's gaps, at the technical-design level rather than the market level
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Can agent protocols be efficient, versatile, and portable simultaneously?
Agent communication protocols seem to force tradeoffs between efficiency, versatility, and portability. What design choices create these constraints, and can they be overcome?
both analyze protocol proliferation, but this note adds the competitive-market consequence the taxonomy doesn't address
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How will competing Agent Skills be evaluated and ranked?
O'Reilly frames Agent Skills as informal protocols that compete through market adoption rather than formal specification. The open question is what criteria or mechanisms will identify which Skills are actually better as they proliferate.
companion note from the same essay, extending the protocol frame from agent communication to codified work practices
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Could agentic commerce reach one trillion dollars by 2030?
McKinsey projects that AI agents acting on behalf of shoppers could orchestrate up to $1 trillion in US retail revenue by 2030, enabled by emerging interoperability protocols. What assumptions and adoption rates underlie this market-sizing estimate?
Extends: McKinsey quantifies protocols' market-shaping power, estimating MCP and peer protocols could enable $1 trillion in US retail revenue by 2030
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Will agent economies develop as open webs or closed gardens?
Whether AI agents will communicate freely across platforms or be locked into proprietary ecosystems controlled by tech incumbents. This matters because it determines who captures value and controls market access in a future agentic economy.
Extends O'Reilly: Rothschild generalizes the MCP example into a claim that standards, not capability, decide open web vs walled gardens
Related papers in this collection 8
Papers most semantically related to this note, ranked by cosine similarity in the embedding space.
- Missing Mechanisms for the Agentic Economy
- Magentic Marketplace: An Open-Source Environment for Studying Agentic Markets
- Vertical tacit collusion in AI-mediated markets
- Agentic markets
- Choose Your Agent: Tradeoffs in Adopting AI Advisors, Coaches, and Delegates in Multi-Party Negotiation
- Algorithmic Collusion by Large Language Models
- On the Fragility of AI Agent Collusion
- A Technical Taxonomy of LLM Agent Communication Protocols
Original note title
O'Reilly argues protocols function as market-shaping mechanisms — MCP turned the winner-take-all AI chatbot race into a web with many winners