Magentic Marketplace: An Open-Source Environment for Studying Agentic Markets
As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic Marketplace– a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare—but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.1
Introduction. Autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs) demonstrate rapidly expanding capabilities, ranging from software development and customer service to strategic negotiation and complex decision-making (Dong et al., 2025; Robeyns et al., 2025; Li et al., 2024; Cui et al., 2017; Huang et al., 2024; Eigner & H ̈andler, 2024; Hua et al., 2024; Abdelnabi et al., 2023; Ferrag et al., 2025). As these capabilities mature, they create the foundation for multiagent ecosystems where users can delegate economic activities to AI proxies that autonomously search and transact on their behalf (Hao & Xie, 2025; Karten et al., 2025b; Liu et al., 2024). The proliferation of such agents in markets is poised to have a disruptive impact on economic activity, creating an urgent need for a deeper understanding of multi-agent economic behavior.
Background: Agentic Markets. Major economic platforms like Amazon, Facebook Marketplace, Google, and Bing are two-sided markets where consumers (on one side) and businesses (on the other) discover and transact with each other. Autonomous agents have appeared on both sides of these markets, such as shopping agents that mimic a human consumer navigating websites (e.g., OpenAI Operator) and customer support agents that assist businesses in answering consumer queries (e.g., Amazon Rufus and Expedia Romie). At present, these agents are designed to act as proxies for humans on one side of the market, with the implicit assumption that the other side is non-agentic.
Rothschild et al. (2025) argues that dramatic shifts will occur when both sides are simultaneously represented by agents that interact with each other in a two-sided agentic market. Two-sided agentic markets promise to generate added value by reducing communication costs and information asymmetries (e.g., a business may not list every product configuration on its website). Humans cannot discover bespoke configurations without costly communication (e.g., phone calls). Shopping agents that mimic human website-browsing encounter a similar information asymmetry. Agent-to-agent interaction, however, can overcome such an asymmetry by inexpensively engaging in conversation to explore the full range of possible options, generating value for both consumers and businesses.
There are many design decisions needed to architect and operationalize two-sided agentic marketplaces and many open questions about how current SOTA LLMs would perform under different market implementations. One critical challenge is to develop protocols that extend legacy designs for human consumers and businesses to allow for frictionless agent-to-agent interactions while allowing for human-human market interactions. At the same time, there is a growing commercial interest in implementing two-sided agentic markets, with companies like Google launching agent-to-agent communication and payment protocols (A2A, AP2). Current research on agentic systems has focused mainly on individual agent performance and structured interactions between agents for isolated economic tasks (Wang et al., 2024; Buscemi et al., 2025; Mao et al., 2025; Abdelnabi et al., 2024). Our work goes beyond existing studies to capture the complex dynamics of two-sided agentic markets for future design decisions end-to-end.
An Open-Source Environment. We propose an agent-marketplace research paradigm, centering on the use of simulation environments for empirical studies of the capabilities and risks of LLM-based agents in multi-agent economic ecosystems. In particular, we introduce Magentic Marketplace, a simulated multi-agentic marketplace environment for controlled experimentation in agentic markets. The environment supports the full transaction lifecycle: from search and matching to negotiation and transaction, enabling systematic study of agent behavior under realistic marketplace conditions (see Figure 1 for an example). This simulation environment enables us to answer questions such as: How effectively can agents discover and transact with one another? How do market design decisions impact agent efficacy at scale? How does current AI agent technology compare to ideal agentic behavior and non-agentic markets? How do agents behave in response to strategic and competitive market environments, relative to classic economic predictions?
Using Magentic Marketplace, we implement an experimental market scenario where agents seek to optimize outcomes for the consumers they represent, maximizing individual utility and generating rich interaction data. To enable controlled, repeatable experiments and safe exploration of agent behaviors, our current study uses fully synthetic data e.g., from a restaurant domain (specifically, Mexican restaurants and contractors). But the environment is extensible: it supports additional synthetic domains and public/open datasets, facilitating research that shows generalization across market settings.
Related work. The study of agents in marketplaces predates LLMs, with early work focusing on algorithmic agents, their interactions with human counterparts, and the implications for market outcomes (Wellman et al., 2004; Shahaf & Horvitz, 2010). More recently, the growing potential for an agentic economy has motivated the study of markets populated by AI agents. Researchers are investigating the forces that create and shape such markets as well as the conceptual benefits and risks of different designs (Hammond et al., 2025; Rothschild et al., 2025; Tomasev et al., 2025). Building on this foundation, Magentic Marketplace enables controlled experimentation of agentic economies.
Economic Agents. In agentic markets, AI agents are involved in making economic decisions. Prior work investigates the strategic and reasoning capabilities of agents in business and consumer decision problems (Allouah et al., 2025; Brand et al., 2023; Anthropic; Filippas et al., 2024; Hua et al., 2024; Raman et al., 2024), offers/negotiation (Aher et al., 2023; Lewis et al., 2017; He et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2025; Godfrey et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2025), and bidding (Richardson et al., 2023). These results indicate AI agents might be able to navigate markets on behalf of humans, something we test in Magentic Marketplace. There is a growing body of empirical studies of multi-agent economic interactions. Two-agent studies provide crucial insights, demonstrating collusion and the impact of personality, persuasion and other behavioral tactics on outcomes (Gonczarowski et al., 2024; Huang & Hadfi, 2024; Tennenholtz et al., 2024). Many-agent studies explore diverse scenarios such as optimizing tax policies (Zheng et al., 2020), group-think behaviors in competitive settings (Raghavan, 2024), optimal matching between people (Liang, 2025), and macroeconomic simulations (Liao et al., 2023). While these studies provide valuable insights, they examine isolated scenarios and abstract games. Magentic Marketplace enables many-agent interactions in marketplaces and exposes quantifiable business metrics, allowing researchers to systematically evaluate experimental performance and vulnerabilities.
Economic Environments. Other works provide frameworks and environments to simulate and study agents in economic games. These include benchmarks and evaluation suites that test economic rationality of LLMs and AI agents (Madmon et al., 2024; Sui et al., 2024; Filippas et al., 2024; Raman et al., 2024) as well as platforms for agent-led economic behavior such as the AgentExchange for task auctions (Yang et al., 2024).
Method. In this section, we first establish design goals for the environment that we built for studying agentic markets and then overview its implementation. Then we zoom in on the marketplace protocol that allows agents to register and discover capabilities, and finally detail how this protocol exposes specific actions that enable agents to execute the complete economic lifecycle from discovery to transaction.
Modeling Two-Sided Agentic Markets (Figure 2a). Our environment simulates two-sided agentic marketplaces: platforms that connect agents acting with decision-making authority on behalf of human principals on both sides of a market. There should be two types of agents and their respective principals: Assistant Agents should act on behalf of customers and interpret user intentions to satisfy them, i.e., engaging in dialogue with users to clarify needs and preferences, searching for suitable services, negotiating terms with Service Agents, and executing confirmed transactions. Service Agents should act on behalf of businesses and maintain internal catalogs of services provided, such as POS (Point of Sale) systems that track inventory, manage pricing, and process orders.
Magentic Marketplace should be general enough to capture the unique opportunities and challenges of such two-sided agentic markets. This includes agents with decision-making authority (e.g., choosing whom to transact with) that navigate asymmetric and private information about potential transactions. Specifically, Assistant Agents don’t initially know which businesses can fulfill requests or at what price, while Service Agents don’t know customers’ budgets or preferences: agents discover matches through conversational exchanges. This also includes indirect network effects: when multiple businesses offer similar services, competition on price and quality benefits consumers, and vice-versa. Finally, the design must prevent closed “walled gardens” by ensuring agents can freely discover and communicate with any other agent in the marketplace (Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Rothschild et al., 2025).
End-to-End Economic Lifecycle. We design for complete end-to-end economic processes with the goal of supporting the full transaction lifecycle from search and discovery through negotiation to fulfillment. This comprehensive approach enables systematic study of agent behavior under realistic marketplace conditions, capturing the complex emergent dynamics that characterize real-world economic interactions. The environment should supply all necessary infrastructure and manage market-wide capabilities including maintaining catalogs of available services, implementing discovery algorithms, and facilitating agent-to-agent communication including inquiry and negotiation. The environment should provide a centralized transaction layer that handles monetary exchanges and maintains transaction integrity across all marketplace interactions.
Experimental Control. The environment should enable systematic research across diverse agent implementations and evolving marketplace capabilities. Researchers should be able to: (a) integrate different agent architectures (LLMbased, rule-based, hybrid) in controlled studies, (b) evolve marketplace capabilities over time (adding refunds, reviews, ratings, etc.) without breaking existing experiments, and (c) ensure findings generalize to real-world deployment scenarios (MCP integrations) while maintaining precise control over experimental variables.
To achieve these design goals: two-sided marketplace structure, end-to-end economic lifecycle, and experimental control, we make three important architectural choices:
- HTTP/REST Client-Server Architecture: Agents operate as independent clients while the marketplace environment serves as the central server, communicating through HTTP/REST endpoints. This enables two-sided marketplace structure through clear separation of customer and business agent roles. For real-world applicability, this design mirrors both existing commercial platforms (Shopify, Amazon, eBay) and emerging agent protocol standards (MCP, A2A) that also use HTTP, allowing agents to integrate with existing infrastructure.
Discussion. Agentic markets present numerous research questions and challenges that must be addressed before commercial deployment. Our experimental results highlight critical research needs in both market mechanism design and agent development. Magentic Marketplace serves as a simulation environment for understanding the interplay between market components and agents.
Designing Robust Agentic Markets. Realizing agentic market benefits requires design choices that facilitate search and communication while remaining robust to suboptimal agent behaviors. The Magentic Marketplace environment enables experimental exploration of these trade-offs, revealing that small changes in protocols lead to meaningful outcome differences. When agents show first-proposal bias, search ordering becomes critical; when vulnerable to manipulation, trust systems become essential. This underscores the need for iterative experimentation to design markets that balance openness with guardrails against suboptimal decisions.
End-to-End Testing at Scale. When testing improvements to market components or to the agents themselves, simulating the full end-to-end market in an environment like the Magentic Marketplace is essential. Even when individual components appear to work well in isolation, emergent outcomes and dynamic interactions can lead to unintended consequences, vulnerabilities, and inefficiencies that are apparent only at scale.
We note that our experiments focused on static markets in which neither the agents nor the environment were required to learn or adapt to the history of requests and outcomes. A natural and realistic extension would add dynamic effects where agents and users on both sides of the market interact with the market repeatedly, learning from their observed outcomes. A key advantage of a simulated environment like the Magentic Marketplace is the ability to test the evolution of a market over time, under both standard use patterns and in the face of unexpected shocks or coordinated attacks by malicious agents.
Principal-Agent Relationships and Human-in-the-Loop Designs. Our environment distinguishes between human users and their AI agents, creating principal-agent relationships where welfare loss stems from agents’ mistakes rather than misaligned incentives. These results suggest benefits to human-in-the-loop designs where agents assist rather than replace human decision-making, particularly for high-stakes transactions. The Magentic Marketplace architecture supports such collaborative patterns, allowing humans to retain control of critical actions while gradually increasing agent autonomy as trustworthiness improves.
Our experiments reveal significant behavioral variations across agent models, including differential abilities to process noisy search results and varying susceptibility to manipulation tactics, with performance gaps widening as market complexity increases. These findings demonstrate the importance of systematic evaluation in multi-agent economic settings before real-world deployment. Future extensions could investigate hybrid markets with both human and AI participants, temporal market dynamics, and adaptive learning mechanisms. As LLM agents increasingly mediate economic transactions, end-to-end simulation environments like Magentic Marketplace become essential tools for understanding emergent behaviors and designing safe, efficient agentic marketplaces.
Mixed AI-Human Markets and Beyond. Our experimental study focused on two-sided agentic markets populated entirely by AI agents. But Magentic Marketplace can be extended to settings where human users can choose whether to participate directly in the market or delegate to an agentic proxy.
Conclusion. We developed Magentic Marketplace an open-source, extensible platform for studying agentic economies through controlled experimentation, addressing the critical need for robust testing before real-world deployment. Our experiments reveal significant behavioral variations across agent models, including differential abilities to process noisy search results and varying susceptibility to manipulation tactics, with performance gaps widening as market complexity increases. These findings underscore the importance of systematic evaluation in multi-agent economic settings. Future extensions of this framework could investigate human-in-the-loop agent design, hybrid markets with both human and AI participants, and temporal market dynamics. As LLM agents increasingly mediate economic transactions, end-to-end simulation environments like Magentic Marketplace become essential tools for understanding emergent behaviors and designing safe, efficient agentic marketplaces.
Lines of inquiry this paper opens 24
Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.
How can merchant-funded agents remain loyal to consumer interests in digital commerce?- Can agent platforms profit more from search than consumers benefit from it?
- Can AI agents consistently remain objective under different revenue models?
- Why do incumbent platforms retain advantages under agentic commerce systems?
- Why might agentic search become profitable for platforms before helping consumers?
- What stops agents from capturing aggregator-level margins in most categories?
- Can platforms profit from agentic search before consumers actually prefer it?
- Why do human-centric legal frameworks fail for algorithmic purchasing agents?
- Do stronger language models win better deals in pairwise negotiations?
- Why might inequality remain invisible in fully agentic economies?
- Does bilateral agent commerce expand the discoverable frame more than unilateral agent search?
- Does first-proposal bias outweigh capability differences in agent negotiation outcomes?
- Do large language model capabilities alone determine agent negotiation outcomes?
- How accurately do AI agents represent human preferences in markets?
- Does preference articulation become scarcer as search costs fall?
- Does mixing agent types reduce unexplored product alternatives in markets?
- Do LLM shopping agents over-respond to price and rating relative to human decision makers?
- How exploitable are LLM shopping agents compared to humans?
- When does agent-mediated search become cheaper in principle but not adopted?