Sociotechnical Envelopment of Artificial Intelligence: An Approach to Organizational Deployment of Inscrutable Artificial Intelligence Systems
Source: Aleksandre Asatiani, Pekka Malo, Per Rådberg Nagbøl, Esko Penttinen, Tapani Rinta-Kahila, Antti Salovaara; Journal of the Association for Information Systems 22(2):325-352 · 2021
The paper presents an approach for implementing inscrutable (i.e., nonexplainable) artificial intelligence (AI) such as neural networks in an accountable and safe manner in organizational settings. Drawing on an exploratory case study and the recently proposed concept of envelopment, it describes a case of an organization successfully “enveloping” its AI solutions to balance the performance benefits of flexible AI models with the risks that inscrutable models can entail. The authors present several envelopment methods—establishing clear boundaries within which the AI is to interact with its surroundings, choosing and curating the training data well, and appropriately managing input and output sources—alongside their influence on the choice of AI models within the organization. This work makes two key contributions: It introduces the concept of sociotechnical envelopment by demonstrating the ways in which an organization’s successful AI envelopment depends on the interaction of social and technical factors, thus extending the literature’s focus beyond mere technical issues. Secondly, the empirical examples illustrate how operationalizing a sociotechnical envelopment enables an organization to manage the trade-off between low explainability and high performance presented by inscrutable models. These contributions pave the way for more responsible, accountable AI implementations in organizations, whereby humans can gain better control of even inscrutable machine-learning models.
Introduction. Advances in big data and machine-learning (ML) technology have given rise to systems using artificial intelligence (AI) that bring significant efficiency gains and novel information-processing capabilities to the organizations involved. While ML models may be able to surpass human experts’ performance in demanding analysis and decision-making situations (McKinney et al., 2020), their operation logic differs dramatically from humans’ ways of approaching similar problems. Rapid growth in the volumes of data and computing power available has made AI systems increasingly complex, rendering their behavior inscrutable and, therefore, hard for humans to interpret and explain Copyright owned by Association for Information Systems. Use for profit is not allowed. Link to the Journal of AIS: https://aisel.aisnet.org/jais/ Sociotechnical Envelopment of Artificial Intelligence (Faraj et al., 2018; Stone et al., 2016). While the economic value of such systems is rarely in doubt, broader organizational and societal implications, including negative side-effects such as undetected biases, have started to cause concerns (Benbya et al., 2020; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Newell & Marabelli, 2015). Thus, humans’ ability to explain how AI systems produce their outputs, referred to as “explainability” (e.g., Rosenfeld & Richardson, 2016), has become a prominent issue in various fields.
The inscrutability of AI systems leads to a host of ethics-related, legal, and practical issues. ML models, by necessity, operate mindlessly, meaning that they approach the work from a single perspective, with no conscious understanding of the broader context (Burrell, 2016; Salovaara et al., 2019). For example, ML models cannot reflect on the ethics or legality of their actions. Accordingly, an AI system may exhibit unintended biases and discrimination after learning to consider inappropriate factors in its decision-making (Martin, 2019). Through such problems during the training stage and beyond, an organization may (wittingly or not) end up operating in a manner that conflicts with its values (Firth, 2019), with models being susceptible to biases and errors connected with vexing ethics issues, such as discrimination against specific groups of people. Designing models with solid ethics in mind could provide means to identify, judge, and correct such biases and errors (Martin, 2019), but all of this is impossible if the model’s actions are inscrutable. Alongside ethics matters, there are legislative factors that impose concrete and inescapable requirements for explainability (Desai & Kroll, 2017). Public authorities often must honor requirements for transparency in their actions, and private companies may also be compelled to explain and justify, for instance, how they use customer data. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) serves as a prominent example of recent legislative action that promotes the rights of data subjects to obtain an explanation of any decision based on data gathered on them (European Union, 2016).
Yet producing an explainable AI system may not always be feasible. Inscrutability takes many forms, linked to such elements as intentional corporate or state secrecy, technical illiteracy, and innate characteristics of ML models (Burrell, 2016). This multifaceted nature, combined with limitations on human logic, means there are no simple solutions to explainability problems (Edwards, 2018; Robbins, 2020). For example, some legal scholars maintain that the GDPR’s provision for a right to explanation is insufficient and could result in meaningless “transparency” that does not actually match user needs (Edwards & Veale, 2017): while there may technically be an explanation for a given decision, this might not be understandable for the person(s) affected. Though approaches such as legal auditing (O’Neil, 2016; Pasquale, 2015), robust system design (Rosenfeld & Richardson, 2019), and user education may improve explainability in some cases, they are unidimensional and inadequate for tackling the fundamental challenges presented by the mindless operation of AI (Burrell, 2016). In an organizational setting, informationtechnology (IT) systems affect a broad spectrum of stakeholders who display differing, often sharply contrasting, demands and expectations (Koutsikouri et al., 2018). Explanation of AI agents’ behavior is further complicated by the environment wherein AI development takes place, with various incumbent work processes, structures, hierarchies, and legacy technologies. These challenges have prompted calls for human-centered and pragmatic approaches to explainability (Mittelstadt et al., 2019; Ribera & Lapedriza, 2019).
Related work. The recent emergence and proliferation of new generations of ML tools have reawakened interest in organizational AI research (Faraj et al. 2018; Keding 2021; Sousa et al. 2019). Like human intelligence, AI is notoriously difficult to define as a concept. For the purposes of our study, we follow Kaplan and Haenlein (2019) in defining AI as a “system’s ability to interpret external data correctly, to learn from such data, and to use those learnings to achieve specific goals” (p. 17). Complementing conceptual works, empirical studies on the topic have started to appear (e.g., Ghasemaghaei, Ebrahimi, & Hassanein, 2018; Salovaara et al., 2019; Schneider & Leyer, 2019). The papers have increasingly shifted the position of AI research from a largely technical one to a perspective encompassing the social component (Ågerfalk, 2020).
Whereas the technical facet involves the information systems (IS) angle, IT infrastructure, and platforms, the social aspect brings in people, work processes, organizational arrangements, and cultural and societal factors (Sarker et al., 2019). Although scholars have discussed issues such as replacing humans with machines versus augmenting humans’ capabilities (e.g., Davenport, 2016; Jarrahi, 2018; Raisch & Krakowski, in press), there is still little critical empirical work investigating the human aspects involved with deploying and managing AI in organizations (Keding, 2021).
Research on organizations’ implementation and use of AI and other forms of automated decision-making has highlighted some recurrent patterns. First, AI’s mindless and, thereby, error-prone nature necessitates careful control of the AI’s agency and autonomy in the implementation. Humans can serve as important counterweights in this equation (Butler & Gray, 2006; Pääkkönen et al., 2020; Salovaara et al., 2019). The division of labor and knowledge between humans and AI can be arranged in various ways whereby organizations can balance rigidity and predictability against flexibility and creative problem-solving (Asatiani et al., 2019; Lyytinen et al., in press). Second, organizations’ AI agents interact with many types of human stakeholders, each with a particular dependence on AI and distinct abilities to understand its operation (Gregor & Benbasat, 1999; Preece, 2018; Weller, 2019). Studies indicate that AI is rarely considered a “plug-and-play” technology and that an organization deploying it requires a clear implementation strategy that takes into account the wide spectrum of stakeholders (Keding, 2021).
Method. 3.1 The Study Setting The Danish Business Authority (DBA) is a government entity operating under the Ministry of Industry, Business, and Financial Affairs of Denmark. It has approximately 700 employees and is based in Copenhagen, with satellite departments in Silkeborg and Nykøbing Falster. The authority is charged with a wide array of core tasks related to business, clustered around enhancing the potential for business growth throughout Denmark. The DBA maintains the digital platform VIRK, through which Danish companies can submit business documents and that allows the DBA to maintain an online business register (containing approximately 809,000 companies, with roughly 812,000 registrations in all and together filing about 292,000 annual statements per year). The DBA has maintenance and enforcement remits related to laws such as Denmark’s Companies Act, Financial Statements Act, Bookkeeping Act, and Act on Commercial Foundations. In the past, the DBA also collaborated with Early Warning Europe (EWE)—a network established to help companies and entrepreneurs across Europe—to produce support mechanisms for companies in distress. The ML projects analyzed in our study are related to the DBA’s core tasks—for example, understanding VIRK users’ behavior and checking business registrations and annual statements for mistakes and evidence of fraud.
The idea of using ML at the DBA originated in 2016. The agency embarked on AI-related market research, which culminated in several data-science projects and the establishment of the Machine Learning Lab (“the ML Lab” from here on) in 2017. One factor creating the impetus for establishing the ML Lab was tremendous growth in the quantities of various types of documents processed by the DBA. Rather than engage and rely on external consultants, the DBA opted to hire its own data engineers and data scientists. The main reasons for this in-house approach were cost-management concerns and a desire to retain relevant knowledge within the agency. Creating ML solutions internally by combining technologies such as Neo4j graph database management, Docker containers, and Python offers a better fit for the organization than commercial off-the-shelf solutions. Also, the ML Lab’s role is Sociotechnical Envelopment of Artificial Intelligence restricted largely to experimentation and development surrounding proof-of-concept models. If a solution is deemed useful and meets the quality criteria set, its deployment is offloaded to external consulting firms, which then put the model into production use. This decision was primarily based on DBA culture, in which vendors take responsibility for the support and maintenance functions related to their code: the ML models follow the same governance as other IT projects within the DBA.
Hence, DBA operations related to ML are divided between two main entities: a development unit (the ML Lab) and an implementation unit (external consultants). The ML Lab’s role is to collaborate closely with domain experts (hereafter “case workers”) to develop functional prototypes as part of a proof of concept. The lab’s main objective is to prove that the problems identified by the case workers can be solved by means of ML. In combination, the proof of concept and documentation such as the evaluation plan form the foundation for the DBA steering committee’s decision-making on whether to forward the model to the implementation unit. Different stakeholders are accountable for different parts of the process. The ML Lab is responsible for developing the prototype, and the case workers provide domain knowledge to the lab’s staff as that prototype is developed. The case workers also answer for the ML models’ operational correctness, being charged with evaluating each model and with its retraining as needed. The steering committee then decides which models will enter production use and when. Finally, the implementation unit is accountable for implementing the model and overseeing its technical maintenance.
Discussion. In this research, we asked: How can an organization exploit inscrutable AI systems in a safe and socially responsible manner? We sought answers to this question by conducting a case study of a publicly funded organization that regularly deploys AI to improve its operations, which are of importance for society. As described above, the study and analysis of the results built on the concept of envelopment as a possible approach to balancing accuracy with explainability and finding good harmony between efficiency and safety.
The analysis presented above clearly identified three significant findings. First, the case study showed that AI’s envelopment, as a concept, holds empirical validity in an organizational knowledge-work setting. This complements prior envelopment literature (see Floridi, 2011; Robbins, 2020), which is of a purely conceptual nature. Second, we demonstrated that envelopment is far more than a technical matter—to be effective, it has to be situated at the intersection of the technical and the social. Our study showed how social factors pervade all aspects of envelopment and that human agents are an integral part of envelopment, responsible for defining suitable envelopes as well as maintaining and renegotiating them. Finally, the analysis articulated connections between envelopment methods and the choice of ML model. Together, these findings demonstrate the utility of envelopment—sociotechnical envelopment in particular—as an approach to understanding the ways in which AI’s role in an organization can be conceptualized and the ways in which its responsibilities can be defined and managed. We discuss specific implications for theory and practice next.
5.1 Implications for Theory Attending to the considerations described above allows for deeper sociotechnical discussion of enveloping AI, anchored in the DBA case as an example. This is possible via synthesis of prior literature and our empirical results. Sarker et al.’s (2019) review of sociotechnical approaches in IS research, discussed near the beginning of this paper, warns that today’s IS work is in danger of too often being focused on technologies’ instrumental outcomes, since they are easier to measure and evaluate. Sarker and colleagues suggest that sociotechnically oriented IS scholars would do well to address both the instrumental and humanistic outcomes of systems.
In the case of the DBA, any given AI deployment’s possible instrumental outcomes would indeed be easier to analyze and declare than its humanistic outcomes, since they tie in with typical reasons for automating processes, such as aims of increased efficiency and higher precision. However, we saw that such instrumental outcomes are not the only consideration at the DBA: it was deemed crucial that AI projects not lead to misuses of government power or unnecessary profiling/surveillance of either citizens or private enterprises. Such outcomes would be problematic from a humanistic perspective and would compromise the organization’s integrity as a public authority, potentially introducing erosion of public trust. Moreover, AI projects have humanistic outcomes even internally to the DBA. They expand case workers’ opportunities to redesign their work processes—in fact, most of the agency’s projects are undertaken in light of their proposals—and case workers are also directly involved in AI development processes. This serves to increase workplace democracy, empowerment, and occupational well-being. The DBA’s AI envelopment is clearly a sociotechnical process: the technical specification of limits for AI’s operations takes place via a social process wherein the case workers and other stakeholders are central actors.
Conclusion. We find considerable promise in our definition and operationalization of sociotechnical envelopment in an organizational context. The findings shed light on specific instances of envelopment and they aid in identifying particular socially and technically oriented approaches to envelopment. We have been able to offer, as a starting point, a tantalizing glimpse of the capabilities and limitations of various sociotechnical envelopment approaches for addressing issues related to the safer use of AI for human good.
Limitations. Our research has some limitations. First, we used purposive sampling and studied a government unit as our empirical case since we presumed it would provide an empirically rich setting for gathering data on the use of AI. This choice, while supplying ample evidence of the envelopment strategies employed, did restrict us to studying such strategies in the specific setting of a public organization. Further research could examine envelopment of AI in a larger variety of contexts. For example, private firms driven by differently weighted objectives might use other types of envelopment strategies or employ the ones we studied in different ways. Moreover, our study did not find evidence pertaining to function envelopment—likely because the purposes of AI’s use at the DBA are already strictly mandated by laws and regulations. Indeed, there was seldom reason to discuss whether the DBA’s AI solutions should be applied to purposes for which they were never designed. Second, while our access to the case organization permitted in-depth analysis of the envelopment strategies applied, we could not examine their long-term implications. Further research is needed to probe the impacts of these envelopment strategies over time.
Lines of inquiry this paper opens 24
Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.
What organizational practices enable successful AI tool adoption? When does governance become the bottleneck for agentic AI?- What specific governance designs would resolve accountability gaps in human-AI teams?
- How do organizational policies shape human agency around agentic AI?
- Does task specialization between humans and AI produce better outcomes than ensembling?
- How do collaboration preferences between humans and AI differ across unfamiliar versus expert domains?
- How do organizations actually combine human judgment with AI in practice?
- What research methods best capture human-AI collaboration in real organizations?
- Which workplace AI design principles matter most to business users?
- Can a system stay manual on information acquisition while highly automated on decision selection?
- How much control should AI agents or humans hold by default during task execution?
- What makes human-algorithm collaboration a strategic organizational capability?
- When can aggregating human and AI decisions outperform either alone?
- Why do human-AI combinations underperform on decision tasks but succeed in creation?
- What divides serial versus parallel architectures in human-AI decision systems?
- When humans retain final decisions while AI proposes methods, who answers for errors?
- Can keeping humans in high-stakes decisions prevent automation failures?