Hallucination is Inevitable: An Innate Limitation of Large Language Models

Paper · arXiv 2401.11817 · Published January 22, 2024
LLM Failure Modes

In this paper, we formalize the problem and show that it is impossible to eliminate hallucination in LLMs. Specifically, we define a formal world where hallucination is defined as inconsistencies between a computable LLM and a computable ground truth function. By employing results from learning theory, we show that LLMs cannot learn all of the computable functions and will therefore always hallucinate. Since the formal world is a part of the real world which is much more complicated, hallucinations are also inevitable for real world LLMs. Furthermore, for real world LLMs constrained by provable time complexity, we describe the hallucination-prone tasks and empirically validate our claims. Finally,

For example, in the survey paper [29], the authors attribute hallucination in natural language generation to heuristic data collection, innate divergence, imperfect representation learning, erroneous decoding, exposure bias, and parametric knowledge bias. A plethora of methods have been proposed to mitigate hallucination.

Up to now, research on LLM hallucination remains largely empirical. Useful as they are, empirical studies cannot answer the fundamental question: can hallucination be completely eliminated? The answer to this question is fundamental as it indicates a possible upper limit of LLMs’ abilities. How-ever, since it is impossible to empirically enumerate and test every possible input, formal discussion on this question is impossible without a clear definition and formal analysis of hallucination. In the real world, formally defining hallucination, a factual or logical error of LLM, turns out to be extremely difficult. This is because a formal definition of semantics in the real world is still an open problem [12, 58]. Hence in this work, we rigorously define a formal world of computable functions, wherein precise discussions on hallucination is feasible. In this world, hallucination occurs whenever an LLM fails to exactly reproduce the output of a computable function. Under this definition, we present a fundamental result that hallucination is inevitable for any computable LLM, regardless of model architecture, learning algorithms, prompting techniques, or training data. Since this formal world is a part of the real world, the result also applies to LLMs in the real world.

Lines of inquiry this paper opens 24

Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.

Can language model hallucination be prevented or only managed? Do accurate-looking LLM outputs hide structural failures in learning and reasoning? Why does verification consistently lag behind AI generation? Why do language models reinforce false assumptions instead of correcting them? How should models express uncertainty rather than forced confident answers? How effectively do deterministic tools improve language model reasoning on formal tasks? Do language models learn genuine linguistic structure or just surface patterns? Do reasoning traces faithfully represent or merely mimic actual model reasoning? Does recurrence enable reasoning capabilities that fixed-depth transformers cannot achieve?