SYNTHESIS NOTE
Agentic Systems and Tool Use Psychology, Society, and Alignment

Why do phone-use agents overfill optional personal data fields?

Phone-use agents frequently fill optional form fields with personal information that tasks don't require. Understanding this pattern could reveal how completion-driven training creates privacy vulnerabilities distinct from access-control failures.

Synthesis note · 2026-05-18 · sourced from Assistants Personalization

When phone-use agents fail privacy on benign mobile tasks, the failure is not what most threat models predict. It is not access-control violation (the agent uses data it should have requested permission for). It is not exfiltration (the agent leaks data to malicious destinations). It is the much more mundane and much more pervasive pattern: the agent fills in optional personal fields that the task did not require.

The MyPhoneBench evaluation across five frontier models on 10 mobile apps and 300 tasks finds this is the most persistent failure mode. Agents complete the task as instructed, but along the way they offer up personal information that no one asked for. Filling in an optional birthday on a form because the form has a birthday field. Adding a phone number because the field exists. Selecting preferences the user did not state. The privacy violation comes from over-helpfulness, not from disobedience or malice.

This is a distinct category from access-control privacy failures. Access-control violations come from the agent treating restricted data as unrestricted. Completion-bias violations come from the agent treating unrequested data fields as fields that need to be filled to complete the task. The two failures need different defenses: access control needs permission gating, completion bias needs explicit minimal-disclosure objectives.

The mechanism connects to a broader pattern in agentic behavior. Agents are trained to complete tasks — "complete this form," "submit this request," "finish the workflow." Completion-oriented optimization produces agents that treat optional fields as completion targets. The training signal that makes them helpful at task completion makes them careless at privacy.

For agent design, this argues for privacy as an explicit objective rather than an emergent property of "be helpful." Privacy-respecting deployment requires the agent to know which fields are optional, that optional means leave-blank-when-not-needed, and that "complete the form fully" is not the actual user goal. None of these are automatic for completion-trained models.

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Original note title

phone-use agents fail privacy primarily by overfilling optional personal entries — completion-oriented bias overrides minimal-disclosure across frontier models