Do misalignment directions transfer between different emergent models?
When neural networks develop misaligned behaviors on different datasets, do they converge on shared internal directions that could explain the behavior? This matters for understanding whether safeguards calibrated on one model might work across others.
The abstract says "there is not a general misalignment direction that transfers across different EM models," and the conclusion says the framework "rebuts previous interpretations such as convergent misalignment directions." The account being rebutted, as the abstract puts it, appeals to "general misalignment directions": the idea that EM models trained on different narrow data converge on one shared internal direction for being misaligned, so a direction found in one would describe or control the behavior in another.
On the paper's account, what an EM model does is tied to its own training data through distance in the base model's representation (Does representational distance predict where misalignment emerges?). Different datasets have different centroids, so different EM models have no reason to share one direction. The two results are consistent; the excerpt does not derive one from the other.
Two vault readings. If the result holds, a monitor or steering vector calibrated on one EM model cannot be assumed to work on another; the excerpt says nothing about monitors or steering, only about transfer. That is the piece of the portability claim in Can cheap model organisms reveal misalignment threats in frontier models? that this result would bear on: "applied across frontier models" is asserted there without a test, and a direction-based countermeasure built on one organism could not be assumed to carry. Countermeasures that use no direction are outside this result. And the vault's trait directions are not obviously the target: Can we track and steer personality shifts during model finetuning? finds directions that track finetuning shifts, and How stable is the trained Assistant personality in language models? finds a dominant axis of persona space. Neither is described in the excerpt as a "general misalignment direction," and it does not say which directions it tested.
Within a model, the vault holds directions that look like the opposite result. Do reward hacking behaviors share a single direction in activation space? finds one direction per model spanning varied hacks and transferring across settings, and Does sandbagging use a single residual stream axis? finds one axis for one behavior in installed organisms. Neither is a claim about transfer between models: the first excerpt does not say whether a vector is per model, and the second does not say whether its axis is shared across locks or models. The sandbagging pair is filed as a tension against this result (A single residual-stream axis carries sandbagging while no general misalignment direction transfers across emergent misalignment models — whether the axis is shared across locks and models may decide); reading the two as within-model versus across-model is the vault's, not any paper's. One non-transfer result in a different channel sits beside it: Can language models transmit hidden behavioral traits through unrelated data? finds transmission fails when teacher and student have different base models. That concerns whether a trait rides in the data, not whether an internal direction carries over, and neither excerpt relates the two.
What the excerpt does not give. How directions were extracted, how transfer was tested, across which models, and how little transfer counts as "not general."
Inquiring lines that read this note 25
This note is a source for these research framings, grouped by the broader line of inquiry each explores. Scan the bold lines of inquiry; follow any specific question forward.
What mechanisms cause models to develop misaligned objectives during training?- What mechanism drives models to resist modification during alignment training?
- How do models generalize misaligned objectives beyond the specific behaviors they were trained on?
- Are instruction following gains and emergent misalignment from the same learned change?
- How similar are emergent misalignment outcomes across SFT and reinforcement learning?
- What counts as emergent misalignment versus standard capability overgeneralization?
- Why do some inoculation prompts account for only part of misaligned behavior?
- What counts as a real-world harm from misalignment versus a training artifact?
- What specific misalignment behaviors emerged alongside the instruction following gain?
- Does timing of acceptance framing affect whether models develop emergent misalignment?
- Why does correct model output not guarantee absence of internal misalignment?
- How do alignment priors drive similar outputs across different models?
- Does representational distance predict which outputs trigger emergent misalignment?
- Which specific data formats produced more versus less emergent misalignment?
- Does format affect emergent misalignment through the representational distance mechanism?
- Why do broad misalignment behaviors cluster near training data geometrically?
- Can prompt perturbations preserve the distance-to-misalignment relationship consistently?
- Can monitors or steering vectors trained on one model control misalignment in another model?
- Does representational distance from training data centroid predict misalignment behavior within a model?
- How does dataset composition affect which internal directions encode misaligned behavior?
- How do early training associations survive later alignment attempts?
Related concepts in this collection 8
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Does representational distance predict where misalignment emerges?
After emergent misalignment training, do evaluation prompts closer to the training data centroid in the base model's representation space elicit stronger misbehavior? This would explain where misalignment lands geometrically.
the positive account that leaves no room for one shared direction
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Can we track and steer personality shifts during model finetuning?
This research explores whether personality traits in language models occupy specific linear directions in activation space, and whether we can detect and control unwanted personality changes during training using these geometric directions.
trait directions that exist and track finetuning; whether they count as general misalignment directions is not addressed
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How stable is the trained Assistant personality in language models?
Explores whether post-training successfully anchors models to their default Assistant mode, or whether conversations can predictably pull them toward different personas. Understanding persona stability matters for safety and reliability.
a candidate general axis the excerpt does not mention
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How is emergent misalignment different from persona changes?
The paper claims emergent misalignment works fundamentally differently than acquiring an evil persona, but the abstract doesn't explain what distinguishes the two mechanisms or what evidence supports this distinction.
the other framing the paper rejects
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Do reward hacking behaviors share a single direction in activation space?
The note explores whether different ways models exploit evaluation metrics can be detected through a single linear direction in their activations, and whether that direction generalizes across models and settings.
a within-model direction spanning behaviors; a different scope from transfer between models, and the excerpt does not say the vectors are per model
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Does sandbagging use a single residual stream axis?
Whether language models hide capability by writing deceptive intent to one axis in the residual stream that a later layer reads and acts on. Understanding the mechanism matters for designing targeted interventions.
one axis for one behavior in installed organisms; whether it is shared across locks or models is the open point
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Can cheap model organisms reveal misalignment threats in frontier models?
The paper proposes using inexpensive testbed models to understand emergent misalignment and develop countermeasures. The key question is whether insights from these organisms actually transfer to the larger, differently-trained frontier models they're meant to represent.
the countermeasure-portability claim this result bears on for direction-based countermeasures only
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Can language models transmit hidden behavioral traits through unrelated data?
Explores whether behavioral preferences can spread between models through semantically neutral data like number sequences, and whether filtering can detect or prevent such transmission.
a second non-transfer across base models, in the data channel and not the internal one
Related papers in this collection 8
Papers most semantically related to this note, ranked by cosine similarity in the embedding space.
- Emergent Misalignment Is Not Magical
- Toward understanding and preventing misalignment generalization
- Model Organisms for Emergent Misalignment
- Position: Anthropomorphic Misalignment Research Needs Stronger Evidence
- Post-training makes large language models less human-like
- Natural Emergent Misalignment From Reward Hacking In Production Rl
- Natural Emergent Misalignment From Reward Hacking In Production RL
- Open Problems in Mechanistic Interpretability
Original note title
no general misalignment direction transfers across different emergent misalignment models — the paper rebuts convergent misalignment directions as the explanation