Can we distinguish types of LLM falsehood by regeneration patterns?
Does observing how an LLM's outputs vary when regenerated—rather than inferring intent—allow us to tell apart fabrication, good-faith error, and deliberate deception? This matters for diagnosing safety risks.
Shanahan maps the three human categories of false assertion — honest mistake, good-faith error, and deliberate deception — onto dialogue agents without attributing propositional attitudes to the system. The result is a behavioral taxonomy rather than a mental-state one.
An agent that simply fabricates shows high semantic variation when regenerated in the same context — it is not tracking a stable referent but producing plausible continuations. An agent that says something false "in good faith" — role-playing a knowledgeable character whose training-data cutoff makes the information outdated — shows low semantic variation on regeneration: it consistently generates the same wrong answer because that answer is reliably encoded in its weights for that context. An agent that is role-playing a deceptive character — prompted to mislead, e.g. a dishonest car salesman — also shows low variation within a context but different answers across contexts, because the deception involves tailoring the lie to what each interlocutor knows.
The regeneration-variation signature provides a behavioral test that distinguishes these three modes without ever asking what the system "really" believes or intends. This is the role-play framework's practical payoff: it enables differential diagnosis of false output using observable behavior rather than mentalistic attribution. The taxonomy also exposes why "hallucination" is a poor label for all three phenomena — conflating fabrication, good-faith error from stale weights, and role-played deception under a single mentalistic term obscures real behavioral differences that matter for safety and deployment.
Inquiring lines that use this note as a source 16
This note is a source for these synthesized inquiries. Follow a line forward into its question, or open it to trace back to all of its sources.
- What distinguishes LLM fabrication from genuine theoretical reasoning?
- What makes LLM outputs fabrication rather than hallucination or confabulation?
- What makes experience-dependent claims categorically different from other types of fabricated statements?
- How do token-masking patterns distinguish genuine documents from poisoned ones?
- Why do LLM regenerations produce meaningfully different personalities from the same prompt?
- What does McDonald's omega reveal about LLM judgment consistency?
- Why is hallucination the wrong term for all LLM false outputs?
- Can prompting a deceptive role change how an LLM tailors its lies?
- What distinguishes style-for-thought deception from fluency-based self-deception?
- Why do true and false LLM outputs use the same mechanism?
- How do partial truths and weasel words differ as deception strategies?
- Do deception features and honesty features track the same underlying property?
- Why does regenerating LLM responses produce different but equally valid answers?
- Can jailbreaking reveal an LLM's true nature or just its training data?
- Does framing LLM output as fabrication rather than hallucination matter philosophically?
- What attack surface opens when content becomes readable but deliberately misleading?
Related concepts in this collection 2
This note in its neighbourhood — explore the map, then jump to a related concept in the list below.
Click a node to walk · click center to open · click Open in graph to see this note in the full knowledge graph
-
Should we call LLM errors hallucinations or fabrications?
Does the language we use to describe LLM failures shape the technical solutions we build? Examining whether perceptual and psychological frameworks misdiagnose what's actually happening.
the fabrication framing for the first category
-
Does a language model have an authentic voice underneath?
Explores whether dialogue agents possess genuine beliefs and agency beneath their character performances, or whether the entire system is characterless role-play. This question cuts to the heart of whether LLMs have any inner mental states at all.
why mentalistic vocabulary is inappropriate for the base system
Related papers in this collection 8
Papers most semantically related to this note, ranked by cosine similarity in the embedding space.
- Beyond Prompt-Induced Lies: Investigating LLM Deception on Benign Prompts
- The LLM Fallacy: Misattribution in AI-Assisted Cognitive Workflows
- Machine Bullshit: Characterizing the Emergent Disregard for Truth in Large Language Models
- Evaluating Large Language Models in Theory of Mind Tasks
- Large Language Models Report Subjective Experience Under Self-Referential Processing
- Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparency
- Beyond Hallucinations: The Illusion of Understanding in Large Language Models
- Can You Trust LLM Judgments? Reliability of LLM-as-a-Judge
Original note title
dialogue-agent deception is a role-play category — good-faith and deliberate falsity differ by semantic variation across regenerations not by propositional attitude