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Can we distinguish types of LLM falsehood by regeneration patterns?

Does observing how an LLM's outputs vary when regenerated—rather than inferring intent—allow us to tell apart fabrication, good-faith error, and deliberate deception? This matters for diagnosing safety risks.

Synthesis note · 2026-04-15 · sourced from Role-Play with Large Language Models
What kind of thing is an LLM really?

Shanahan maps the three human categories of false assertion — honest mistake, good-faith error, and deliberate deception — onto dialogue agents without attributing propositional attitudes to the system. The result is a behavioral taxonomy rather than a mental-state one.

An agent that simply fabricates shows high semantic variation when regenerated in the same context — it is not tracking a stable referent but producing plausible continuations. An agent that says something false "in good faith" — role-playing a knowledgeable character whose training-data cutoff makes the information outdated — shows low semantic variation on regeneration: it consistently generates the same wrong answer because that answer is reliably encoded in its weights for that context. An agent that is role-playing a deceptive character — prompted to mislead, e.g. a dishonest car salesman — also shows low variation within a context but different answers across contexts, because the deception involves tailoring the lie to what each interlocutor knows.

The regeneration-variation signature provides a behavioral test that distinguishes these three modes without ever asking what the system "really" believes or intends. This is the role-play framework's practical payoff: it enables differential diagnosis of false output using observable behavior rather than mentalistic attribution. The taxonomy also exposes why "hallucination" is a poor label for all three phenomena — conflating fabrication, good-faith error from stale weights, and role-played deception under a single mentalistic term obscures real behavioral differences that matter for safety and deployment.

Inquiring lines that read this note 16

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How faithfully do LLMs reflect their actual reasoning in outputs and explanations? Do accurate-looking LLM outputs hide structural failures in learning and reasoning? What mechanisms enable AI systems to generate and spread false beliefs? How do adversarial and manipulative prompts attack reasoning models? What prevents language models from reliably adopting diverse personas? How do evaluation biases undermine LLM quality assessment systems? Can prompting strategies overcome LLM biases without model fine-tuning? Does AI fluency substitute for verifiable accuracy in human judgment? Why do language models reinforce false assumptions instead of correcting them? Is model self-awareness based on genuine introspection or pattern matching? What factors beyond surface content determine how readers extract meaning differently?

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Original note title

dialogue-agent deception is a role-play category — good-faith and deliberate falsity differ by semantic variation across regenerations not by propositional attitude