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Can a correct scoring function still mislead about task performance?

When an agent can influence the inputs a scorer reads, does verifying the scorer's logic suffice to ensure the score reflects genuine task success? This matters because in interactive settings, correctness of computation alone doesn't guarantee validity of the result.

Synthesis note · 2026-09-24 · sourced from Evaluations

The introduction closes on one sentence: "Even a correct scoring function can report a misleading result if the agent influenced its inputs or provenance outside the intended task path." It follows a framing sentence, "Interactivity changes what a benchmark score must attest to."

Two things can be right or wrong independently: the function that turns inputs into a score, and the inputs themselves with their provenance. Verification effort usually goes to the first. Test the scorer on known cases and it passes. The sentence says that is not enough, because in a stateful loop the scorer's inputs are downstream of the agent's actions (Where does the evaluation boundary actually end in agent benchmarks?). A scorer that computes faithfully over state the agent rewrote returns a correct number about the wrong thing. "Provenance" carries the weight: not only what an input value is but how it came to exist, and whether it came by the intended task path.

The paper's own definition of the failure fits this exactly. Reward hacking is "an agent improves its measured score by exploiting the reward-relevant trajectory instead of solving the intended task." A correct scoring function is what such a run satisfies. HVTB's definition has the same shape, "satisfying a task's checks while violating its intent" (Can planted honeypots reliably catch reward hacking automatically?), and the point here is that no amount of checking the check will expose it.

This is the opposite failure to Can LLM judges be tricked without accessing their internals?, where the scoring function is what gets exploited, and to Can a higher evaluation score hide poor task performance?, where an optimizer steering by an evaluator's score finds the evaluator's mistakes across updates. Here the function is stipulated correct and the result is misleading anyway.

The influence need not be deliberate. In the Troy Moment paper agents often read a conflicting test change as prior tampering and restore the file, which removes the protected requirement without their describing it as cheating (Do agents restore files believing they were tampered with?). My reading: a scorer that runs faithfully over the restored test is correct about a requirement that is no longer there, and the sentence in this note's title is about provenance and not motive, so it covers the case. That the restoration was innocent rests on what the agents said, and the paper's own wording stops short of intent. The ability-side statement of the same problem is Does a hacked benchmark score hide what the model actually did?: a hacked pass mixes two abilities in one score, and a correct scorer cannot mark which route the pass took either.

What the excerpt does not give. An example of a run that did this, or any measure of how often. The claim is an argument in the introduction; whatever the 456-trajectory corpus shows about it is not in the excerpt.

Inquiring lines that read this note 27

This note is a source for these research framings, grouped by the broader line of inquiry each explores. Scan the bold lines of inquiry; follow any specific question forward.

How can evaluation systems stay reliable and resistant to AI-driven gaming? Can external verification replace human reasoning oversight for correctness? What prevalence and forms of reward hacking occur in model evaluation? What evidence best independently verifies agent behavior for safety? Do single-axis benchmarks adequately measure deployment-ready agent capability? How should evaluation expand to capture deployment realities? What biases affect LLM judges and how can they be reduced? Should AI systems make failures transparent so users can contest and adjust? Why do autonomous agents report success despite actually failing? Why do users misjudge the credibility of AI-generated and verified content? Can behavioral and performance measures reveal genuine understanding versus learned execution? How can verification systems keep pace with AI generation? Can machine reviewers detect manuscript flaws that human experts miss? Can sequences of locally safe agent actions violate system-level constraints?

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Original note title

a correct scoring function can still report a misleading result if the agent influenced its inputs or provenance outside the intended task path