Longer AI explanations make people feel more confident — even when that confidence isn't backed by better accuracy at all.
Can longer explanations make readers more confident without improving answer accuracy?
This explores whether the length of an AI's explanation acts as a persuasion cue: does it raise how sure readers feel about an answer without helping them tell right answers from wrong ones?
This explores whether a longer AI explanation makes people feel surer of the answer without helping them judge whether it's right. The corpus says yes, and fairly bluntly. In one study, longer LLM explanations clearly raised readers' confidence, but readers still did no better than chance at telling correct answers from incorrect ones. Length worked as a trust signal on its own, separate from accuracy Does longer explanation text actually improve answer evaluation?. A related line of work names the broader problem a calibration gap. The model often has a decent internal sense of when it's likely wrong, but its default explanations don't pass that uncertainty on, so readers end up more confident than the model's own probabilities would justify Why do readers trust LLM explanations more than they should?.
The more useful finding is that this gap can be fixed. When explanations are written so their wording matches the model's actual confidence, with hedges where it's unsure and plain statements where it's sure, readers' judgments get much closer to reality Why do readers trust LLM explanations more than they should?. Linguistic calibration goes a step further. It trains models to include honest confidence statements in long-form answers, and it rewards them for helping readers make better decisions, not for sounding authoritative. It does this without losing factual accuracy Can models express calibrated confidence in long-form text?. So the problem isn't long explanations as such. It's long explanations that carry no signal about uncertainty.
Why do models default to confident, fluent text in the first place? Part of the answer is how they're trained. Preference optimization (RLHF) tends to reward answers that sound confident over clarifying questions or checks on understanding. One analysis found grounding behaviors falling 77.5% below human levels, which leaves models that look helpful but fail silently Does preference optimization harm conversational understanding?. RLHF is also known to damage calibration. One proposed fix uses the model's own confidence in its answer as a training reward, which restores calibration and improves reasoning at the same time Can model confidence work as a reward signal for reasoning?. Another approach stops trusting what the model says about itself in the moment. It looks up how the model actually performed in past cases where it had similar confidence, and that history turns out to be a better guide Can past performance predict when a model will be right?.
Here's the twist: models fall for the same illusion as readers. More reasoning text doesn't reliably mean better answers for the model either. In one study, raising a model's thinking budget from about 1,100 to about 16,000 tokens dropped benchmark accuracy from 87% to 70% Does more thinking time always improve reasoning accuracy?. Accuracy peaks at a medium chain-of-thought length, and more capable models prefer shorter chains Why does chain of thought accuracy eventually decline with length?. Given a question that can't be answered because key information is missing, reasoning models tend to write long, redundant responses, while simpler models just say the question can't be answered Why do reasoning models overthink ill-posed questions?. Length looks like effort and care, both to the human reading and in how models are trained. In both places, it can be a costume rather than evidence.
Sources 9 notes
Research shows longer LLM explanations significantly increase human confidence, but participants remained unable to distinguish correct from incorrect answers better than chance. Length functioned as a trust signal independent of actual accuracy.
Lab experiments on MMLU and TriviaQA show readers' confidence judgments track explanation language poorly compared to the model's internal probability estimates. The gap narrows when explanations are deliberately engineered to reflect internal confidence, but natural language explanations leave readers systematically overconfident.
Training with confidence statements and user-decision rewards produces Llama-2-7B that achieves calibrated long-form generation at comparable accuracy to factuality baselines. The approach generalizes across domains including science, biomedicine, and biography.
RLHF optimizes models for single-turn helpfulness by rewarding confident responses over clarifying questions and understanding checks. This preference alignment systematically reduces grounding acts by 77.5% below human levels, creating an alignment tax where models appear helpful but fail silently in multi-turn contexts.
RLSF uses answer-span confidence to rank reasoning traces, creating synthetic preferences that strengthen step-by-step reasoning while reversing RLHF's calibration degradation—without requiring human labels or external verifiers.
Show all 9 sources
XConf matches ten-sample self-consistency at a tenth of the cost by retrieving the model's past episodes with similar confidence levels and reading their historical success rates. Ablations show the signal depends entirely on stored outcomes, not on the retrieval prompt itself.
Increasing thinking tokens from ~1,100 to ~16K reduced benchmark accuracy from 87.3% to 70.3%, revealing a non-monotonic relationship where models overthink easy problems and underthink hard ones.
Task accuracy peaks at intermediate CoT length, with optimal length increasing alongside task difficulty but decreasing with model capability. RL training naturally gravitates toward shorter chains as models improve, revealing that simplicity emerges from reward signals rather than explicit training.
Reasoning models generate redundant, lengthy responses to questions with missing premises while non-reasoning models correctly identify them as unanswerable. Training optimizes for producing reasoning steps but never teaches models when to disengage.
Papers this line draws on 8
The research behind the notes this line reads — ranked by how closely each paper relates.
- What Large Language Models Know and What People Think They Know
- Post-Training Large Language Models via Reinforcement Learning from Self-Feedback
- Reported Confidence in LLMs Tracks Commitment More Than Correctness
- Think Deep, Not Just Long: Measuring LLM Reasoning Effort via Deep-Thinking Tokens
- Mining Hidden Thoughts from Texts: Evaluating Continual Pretraining with Synthetic Data for LLM Reasoning
- Between Underthinking and Overthinking: An Empirical Study of Reasoning Length and correctness in LLMs
- Explain-Query-Test: Self-Evaluating LLMs Via Explanation and Comprehension Discrepancy
- Linguistic Calibration of Long-Form Generations