Reported Confidence in LLMs Tracks Commitment More Than Correctness

Paper · arXiv 2606.29490
Reinforcement Learning

Confidence is defined as an estimate of the probability that a chosen answer is correct1–3. Verbal confidence reports are widely used as uncertainty measures in large language models4–6, but it remains unclear whether they are best understood as estimates of correctness at all. We test this using a two-stage abstention paradigm inspired by neuroscientific studies of perceptual decision making7,8: a model first answers a question and reports its confidence, then later decides whether to commit that answer to a user or abstain. Across four non-reasoning models, different prompt framings, and confidence formats, verbal confidence predicted the later commit/abstain decision substantially better than it predicted whether the answer was actually correct. Calibrated token log-probabilities showed a contrasting profile: their ability to predict abstention was closely coupled to their ability to discriminate correctness — the signature of an answer-evidence signal. We then asked whether VC’s behavioural alignment is reducible to its correctness-tracking, by removing the variance in verbal confidence shared with calibrated log-probabilities and examining the residual.

Introduction. An important desideratum for large language models is the production of confidence signals that convey their internal estimate of the correctness of their answer1,2. Such signals are operationally important: they communicate how much weight a user should place on a model’s output, and they may also support the model’s own downstream decisions, such as deferring to a human, seeking additional information, or revising a prior commitment2,3,10–12. Multiple elicitation methods have been proposed, including log-probability-based confidence, sampling-based methods, and verbal confidence — the model’s explicit response to a direct question about how confident it is in its answer4,5,13–15. Verbal confidence is of particular interest because it is a black-box measure, applicable in the many settings where the model’s internal probabilities are not accessible. This makes it the only confidence measure available for many widely deployed reasoning and non-reasoning models, and accordingly the subject of growing interest as a default reliability signal.

Discussion / Conclusion. We asked whether verbal confidence (VC) in large language models is best understood as an estimate of answer correctness or as a signal more closely tied to downstream behavioural control. Across four non-reasoning models, two datasets, two abstention prompt framings, and two confidence formats, the evidence consistently favoured the latter interpretation. VC predicted the model’s subsequent commit/abstain decision substantially more strongly than it predicted objective correctness, whereas calibrated log-probability confidence (Cal-LP), derived from the answer-token distribution, showed a contrasting profile: its prediction of abstention remained closely coupled to its prediction of correctness. These contrasting profiles point to structurally different signals: Cal-LP behaves as a truth-evidence signal whose behavioural relevance is inherited from its correctness-tracking, whereas VC carries an additional decision-aligned component that is not reducible to truth-tracking.

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Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.

How should dialogue systems represent uncertainty from noisy speech input? Does RLHF training sacrifice accuracy and grounding for user agreement? What constrains reinforcement learning's ability to expand model reasoning? Why do benchmark improvements fail to reflect actual reasoning quality? What makes AI persuasion effective and how can we counter it? Why do language models reinforce false assumptions instead of correcting them? What capability tradeoffs emerge when scaling model reasoning abilities? How can humans calibrate appropriate trust in AI systems? How should models express uncertainty rather than forced confident answers? How do self-generated feedback mechanisms enable effective model learning? Can model confidence signals reliably improve reasoning quality and calibration? What properties determine whether reward signals teach genuine reasoning? How do language models inherit human biases from training data? How can models identify insufficient information and respond appropriately without guessing? Why does self-revision increase model confidence while degrading accuracy?