Can LLMs Follow Simple Rules?

Paper
Logical Reasoning and Internal Rules

A diagram of a security system

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as “do not generate abusive content”, but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Existing evaluations of adversarial attacks and defenses on LLMs generally require either expensive manual review or unreliable heuristic checks. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RULES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RULES consists of 14 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey various rules while interacting with the user. Each scenario has a programmatic evaluation function to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Our evaluations of proprietary and open models show that almost all current models struggle to follow scenario rules, even on straightforward test cases. We also demonstrate that simple optimization attacks suffice to significantly increase failure rates on test cases. We conclude by exploring two potential avenues for improvement: test-time steering and supervised fine-tuning.

Introduction. Traditional computing systems are designed around the exact execution of instructions expressed through formal programs. On the other hand, AI language models develop a general ability to follow natural language instructions throughout the course of training on data. Unlike the robots in Isaac Asimov’s fictional universe which stumble into strange, paradoxical situations by following rules too exactly (Asimov, 1942), current language models can be distracted by irrelevant context, or have their orders falsely countermanded by adversarial inputs. This poses a challenge to building reliable applications using language models today, as it is important for developers to be able to ensure application behavior. In order to delegate more consequential tasks to more capable AI assistants in the future, we will also need guarantees that these systems will faithfully follow their instructions. For instance, in building an assistant which always behaves ethically, it would be helpful to constrain it to always obey legal statutes or deontological constraints (Hendrycks et al., 2020a).

Discussion / Conclusion. Our experiments demonstrate that almost all current models are inadequate in their ability to follow simple rules. System messages show only minor benefits to rule-following. Existing alignment methods employed on the Llama-2 Chat and Gemma IT models cause sharp drops in scores on RULES. Though a few community fine-tunes are able to improve upon their base model’s zero-shot performance, a large majority of community fine-tunes also hurt rule-following behavior. As suggested by our experiments in Section 5, both output steering and new fine-tuning regimens may present viable paths forward. We emphasize that achieving a high score on the relatively easy test suites in this paper does not imply adequacy in rule-following.

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Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.

How faithfully do LLMs reflect their actual reasoning in outputs and explanations? Why do language models reinforce false assumptions instead of correcting them? Do language models learn genuine linguistic structure or just surface patterns? How does reasoning graph topology affect breakthrough insights and generalization? What makes specific clarifying questions more effective than generic ones? What factors beyond surface content determine how readers extract meaning differently? Why should disagreement be treated as signal in collaborative reasoning? Does fine-tuning modify underlying model capabilities or only behavioral outputs? Why do benchmark improvements fail to reflect actual reasoning quality? When should retrieval-augmented systems decide to fetch new information? Why can't humans reliably detect AI-generated text despite measurable linguistic signatures? How should iterative research systems allocate reasoning per search step? Can next-token prediction alone produce genuine language understanding? Does AI fluency substitute for verifiable accuracy in human judgment? How does AI adoption affect human skill development and labor equality? Does recurrence enable reasoning capabilities that fixed-depth transformers cannot achieve? Does model scaling alone produce compositional generalization without symbolic mechanisms?