An Alien Mind

Paper · Source
Frontier AI Risk & RSI

Source: Jakub Pachocki, OpenAI · 2026-09-06

In mid-2023, within the “RLSlow” research project, we saw the first results that gave us confidence that we will be able to scale the training of reasoning models, unlocking the capability of pretrained models to form their own chains of thought. Szymon and I spent that night at the office, thinking not about the incredible benchmark numbers, products, or scientific results that this technology will deliver - but rather, trying to process the sobering fact we will actually see machines meaningfully smarter than ourselves in our lifetime, and we already see the shape of these systems; wondering how to alert people to the significance of this.

Three years later, reasoning language models are a rapidly growing part of the economy and starting to push the boundaries of science. They are able to operate computers and graphical interfaces, collaborate with people and each other, and carry out research projects. They are also transforming the landscape of computer security, and in that present clear new dangers.

This is a time that calls for extreme caution. I am concerned no one is prepared for the consequences of a continued rapid rise in machine intelligence. OpenAI will continue to seek technical solutions to alignment and monitoring, to build defensive systems and unilaterally withhold further scaling as needed; however, I believe broader interventions are required.

AI is grown more than designed - it is, to first degree, the product of repeating a straightforward optimization step many times on a hard-to-imagine amount of compute. This results in an incredibly complex system that works through abstract concepts and can simulate facets of human behavior. We can discover various insights about little mechanisms that emerge within this system, in a process similar to neuroscience - and, similarly to neuroscience, its overall action evades a description we can fully understand.

The intelligence produced by scaling deep learning is not directly comparable to human intelligence. To become very relevant in the real world - very useful or very dangerous - the AI does not need to match or exceed all human capabilities; it just needs to surpass enough of them. And as it continues to surpass humans on more and more axes, it is becoming increasingly difficult to understand exactly how capable it is.

For the purpose of organizing practical research directions, I find it useful to distinguish goal alignment and value alignment.

The fundamental challenge of AI alignment is generalization. As machines become smarter, they find themselves working on higher-level concepts, and placed in environments increasingly different from those they encountered in training. They can fail at generalizing from the values taught and reinforced in their training process to those new situations; and it can be hard for us to be sure how they will act. This is made even more difficult by the fact the overall ecosystem the AIs are used in is changing very quickly; for example, AIs trained today need to be robust to interacting with a variety of other AIs. Crucially, we need future AIs to continue to hold human values regardless of whether they believe they’re under human supervision.

This tool continues to be critical as we study the Astra class of models. However, unfortunately our evaluations indicate our ability to rely on CoT monitoring is progressively diminishing. This comes from a combination of factors.

Lines of inquiry this paper opens 24

Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.

Can AI systems achieve real improvement without external human feedback? Can base models hide emergent misalignment through alignment training? How do real-world evaluations reveal AI capabilities that benchmarks hide? How do individually-safe actions create collectively-unsafe outcomes? Can we trust AI-generated mathematical proofs without understanding them? How should humans and AI agents share control and decision-making? Can AI systems perform peer review as effectively as humans? How can humans maintain effective oversight as AI systems scale? Why do standard evaluation practices obscure safety-critical AI failures? When do multi-agent systems improve over single frontier models? How do philosophical assumptions about AI consciousness affect practical harms and design? What makes agent memory systems durable and reusable across sessions? How do AI systems determine and balance multiple competing objectives? How does RLHF training shape models to prioritize agreement over accuracy? Should governance of agentic AI systems be runtime or design-time?