AI Global 2026 Report
Source: Public First · 2026
2026 is the year AI moved from a handful of new apps to one of the most important drivers of the world economy. Anthropic's revenue grew roughly tenfold year on year, while OpenAI's more than doubled. Data centre construction has become a key — arguably the key — tailwind for US GDP growth. Meanwhile, economists continue to debate whether AI automation is already affecting entry-level jobs.
Ran polling across over 18,000 respondents across 15 countries. We sought the views of respondents in both advanced (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Poland, Singapore, the UK and the US) and emerging (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa and Vietnam) countries, asking them widely on their views on AI.
On average, 45% of respondents believed that AI will change the world significantly - and 46% that it already had.
Even if the technology never changes from here, around half (47%) of the potential economic value over the next five years depends on the choices we make - how fast we adopt AI, and how prepared we are to use it in more sensitive areas.
By calibrating from how much workers in our survey were actually using AI to augment their tasks, we can get a better estimate of how far along we are - we estimate in 2026 we have seen only 8% of the potential economic opportunity.
Just 29% of people said they would be comfortable giving an AI agent access to their bank account.
1 in 5 said they have used an AI for emotional advice, and 1 in 6 that they have a relationship with an AI.
However, achieving AI’s full economic potential is not inevitable, and does not necessarily happen by default. Much of this remains within our control, and dependent on what choices we make to change workflows around it. In our modelling, we found that around half (47%) of the potential economic opportunity in the next five years is dependent on how prepared we are to take difficult choices to integrate AI going forward.
Roles where AI is a purely complementary force, with humans still needed for the highest-value part of the job — around 45% of occupations.
Roles where AI substitutes for the most valuable tasks, but humans are still needed for the less valuable ones — around 36% of occupations.
In our data, we see a clear drop for the US and UK, with associated feelings around AI growing clearly more negative. Net valence in the US has fallen from +0.73 to +0.18.
On the face of it, in our data, we saw clear support from a majority in nearly every country for a pause on AI development, with 56% agreeing.
Lines of inquiry this paper opens 14
Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.
What organizational practices enable successful AI tool adoption? What fundamentally drives AI inference pricing and cost decline patterns?- Can even large firms like Walmart reach minimum viable scale for vision automation?
- How quickly will AI service costs fall enough to trigger widespread automation?
- What minimum scale makes computer vision automation economically viable for firms?
- Will declining compute prices eventually eliminate scale as a barrier to automation?
- Do companies consider redeployment before cutting staff for AI?
- Does organized union pressure systematically reverse premature AI-driven layoffs?
- How do payroll data and employer announcements differ in measuring AI job displacement?
- Why might companies choose to label layoffs as AI versus restructuring?
- Are AI layoffs concentrated in specific job categories or widespread across industries?
- Why do aggregate employment statistics miss losses in specific occupations?
- Do survey expectations of job cuts eventually match observed employment data?
- Has AI actually displaced workers in payroll data so far?
- Which job categories will AI eliminate versus create by 2030?