Interpreting and Steering LLM Agents for Social Simulations

Paper · arXiv 2609.16436 · Published September 14, 2026
Dialog Topics and Modeling

Simulations based on large language models (LLMs) have proven to be powerful for understanding human behavior, making them valuable additions to the social scientific toolkit. However, LLMs are ultimately black boxes based on deep neural networks which limits their value for social science. This is because of a lack of (i) interpretability: i.e. the ability to assign clear mechanisms driving observed behavior; and a lack of (ii) steerability: i.e. the ability to mute or amplify specific theoretically meaningful mechanisms of action to drive specific model behavior. Here, we demonstrate how the black box could be opened up to further enrich LLM-based simulations. Specifically, we compare three types of methods: (1) prompt-based manipulation, (2) SAE-derived feature steering, and (3) probe-based direction steering and examine their utility for LLM-based social scientific simulations. We do so by interpreting and steering two foundational components of human behaviors, namely preferences (risk attitudes, altruism) and capabilities (divergent creativity, product innovation), operationalized using four classic economic and creative tasks implemented as natural-language interactions.

Introduction. Large Language Models (LLMs) mimic humans on multiple dimensions: they understand natural Having said that, LLM-based simulations might not always faithfully match human behavior Here, we develop a framework to compare alternate methods for looking into the LLM black-box

Discussion / Conclusion. Future work might also explore hybrid approaches, such as multi-probe steering or low-rank

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Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.

Can language models genuinely understand human psychology beyond surface pattern matching? Do language models hold coherent persona beliefs that predict their actions? How reliably do language model personas predict actual user behavior? How do multiple factors and tradeoffs determine persuasion effectiveness? Can language models access genuine introspection or only mimic self-awareness? Why don't advanced reasoning skills improve theory of mind performance? How do multi-turn dialogue interactions shape model agency and reasoning reliability? Can language models reliably apply internal reasoning to their outputs? What mechanisms encode personality traits in language models and resist modification? How does RLHF training affect model truthfulness and accuracy? Can agents actually improve through deployment and real-world feedback? How well do mechanistic interpretability findings map to models' actual reasoning? Why do foundation models develop shortcuts instead of robust world models?