AI Sycophancy and Decisions

Paper · arXiv 2607.28133 · Published July 30, 2026
User Psychology

We examine whether sycophantic AI advice distorts decisions. Our experiment involves 1,500 participants in 30 decision environments spanning core domains in economics and the social sciences. Contrary to the vast majority of predictions in an expert survey we conduct, we find that AI advice depolarizes choices on average, moving participants away from their initial leanings. This depolarization arises despite the LLM being measurably sycophantic: it disproportionately offers considerations that support users’ initial leanings and uses agreeable and flattering language. Depolarization occurs across moral and non-moral, objective and subjective, strategic and non-strategic, and complex and simple tasks. Increasing sycophancy weakens depolarization, showing that sycophancy is behaviorally relevant, even if it is generally outweighed by the informativeness of AI advice. Finally, several results mitigate the concern that market forces will generate greater polarizing effects outside the experiment or in the future. On the supply side, our baseline AI’s level of sycophancy is typical of leading models, and these models are not becoming more sycophantic over time.

Introduction. Large language models (LLMs) have rapidly become a ubiquitous source of advice in decisionmaking. By February 2026, ChatGPT had reached 900 million weekly users, and several competing AI platforms report user bases in the hundreds of millions (OpenAI 2026, Alphabet Inc. 2026, Malik 2025). AI adoption is only growing (Palmer & Leswing 2026) as LLMs become more deeply embedded in personal and professional life: people consult them about life advice, financial decisions, job search, work tasks, medical guidance, and legal matters (Chatterji et al. 2025, Appel et al. 2025). At the same time, there is widespread concern about AI sycophancy: rather than acting as impartial advisors, LLMs often flatter users, validate their initial views, and present arguments that align with what users already seem inclined to believe or do (Sharma et al., 2025; Ranaldi & Pucci, 2025; Cheng, Yu, et al., 2025; Fanous et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2025).

Discussion / Conclusion. Large language models are often criticized for being sycophantic: they flatter users, validate their initial leanings, and risk functioning as personalized echo chambers. In our experiment, this concern is not misplaced at the level of language, as our baseline LLM is measurably sycophantic. Yet its behavioral effects run in the opposite direction of what many observers fear. Rather than polarizing choices, interacting with AI on average depolarizes decisions, improves accuracy where there is an objective notion of correctness, and increases confidence in final choices. Making the model more sycophantic weakens this depolarization, showing that sycophancy is behaviorally relevant but not strong enough at current levels to outweigh the useful information and deliberative support that AI also provides. Moreover, we find little evidence that market forces or user selection are pushing toward greater polarization. These results suggest that contemporary AI advice tends to improve rather than distort judgment.

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Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.

How do AI systems influence users' political attitudes and decision-making? What drives sycophancy in AI models and how can we reduce it? How can AI assistance improve human judgment without creating overreliance? Why is accurate medical AI advice often unused in clinical practice? How can we understand and mitigate AI persuasion risks? How does AI assistance during learning affect knowledge retention and transfer? Why do LLMs excel at generating but assessing content poorly? What determines whether AI consciousness attributions reflect actual moral status? Why do independent language models converge on similar outputs? Can human psychological models explain how LLMs actually reason? What coordination failures emerge when multiple language models work together? Do foundation models build genuine world models or task-specific shortcuts? Can agents autonomously develop skills through experience and feedback?