Towards Mechanistically Understanding Why Memorized Knowledge Fails to Generalize in Large Language Model Finetuning

Paper · arXiv 2607.08393 · Published July 9, 2026
Training and Fine-Tuning

Fine-tuning LLMs to inject new knowledge faces a critical challenge: LLMs can quickly memorize new facts, yet fail to use them for downstream reasoning tasks. We formalize this failure as the Knowing–Using Gap, characterized by an accuracy gap and a temporal lag between memorization and generalization. To understand this phenomenon, we fine-tune LLMs with unseen knowledge and monitor the spatial permeation dynamics of the knowledge internally using a novel intervention technique called self-patching. Self-patching identifies activation locations where relocating representations substantially improves failed generalization cases. These results are consistent with a knowledge-circuit misalignment hypothesis: memorized representations can exist internally but may not be routed to computation-effective layers. To demonstrate the practicality of this diagnostic finding, we design a simple heuristic strategy which recovers 58–75% of the oracle headroom in generalization failure. Experiments are done cross-domain for the robustness of this finding. Code and data are open at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Mem2Gen-71FF.

Introduction. Large language models (LLMs) excel at varieties of tasks but face significant challenges in adapting to unseen information, necessitating effective methods for post-training knowledge updates. While there are approaches like retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and knowledge editing Meng et al., Gupta et al. [2024], fine-tuning remains a fundamental paradigm for knowledge updating, as it not only operates on parametric memory end-to-end but also injects knowledge in a way that can be reused by the model’s existing reasoning capabilities. Despite sufficient capacity to fit new data Morris et al. [2025], Allen-Zhu and Li, LLMs exhibit a “remembering but not using” failure Ovadia et al. [2024], Soudani et al. [2024], Zhong et al. [2023], Cohen et al. [2024], Berglund et al. as shown in Figure 1: models can memorize new facts (e.g., “Sydney is located in [Entity]”) but fail to reliably use them in downstream reasoning (e.g., “The capital of the country Sydney located is ...”) Zhong et al. [2023], Cohen et al. [2024], Yao et al.

Discussion / Conclusion. We identified the Knowing–Using Gap: fine-tuned LLMs memorize injected facts yet fail to use them in multi-hop reasoning. Using self-patching as a causal diagnostic, we trace this failure to knowledge–circuit misalignment—knowledge is encoded in storage-oriented early or late layers but does not permeate into the mid-layer circuits required for reasoning. The gap is thus a routing problem, not a capacity one—knowledge resides in the model, just not where reasoning happens. It is also partially reversible: a heuristic recovers 58–75% of oracle headroom, and the effect replicates across models, scales, and domains. Together, these results recast fine-tuning’s generalization failure as a tractable alignment problem, and point to alignment-aware training as a principled path forward.

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Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.

How do models balance knowledge storage capacity with reasoning capability? How should models integrate new knowledge without forgetting existing capabilities? How does model scale determine performance, and can it be compensated? Can safety at the agent level guarantee system-level safety in multi-agent composition? What memory architectures best support persistent learning across sessions? How do AI systems develop self-improvement without external supervision? How do neural networks achieve compositional generalization without explicit symbolic mechanisms? Does supervised fine-tuning improve accuracy at the cost of reasoning quality? What causes emergent misalignment in models and how do we reliably detect it? What are the mechanisms and limits of recursive self-improvement in AI? What training data properties determine robust versus brittle model reasoning? Why do language models resist adopting different personalities despite conditioning attempts? Can prompting reveal hidden model knowledge or teach genuinely new capabilities? Can iterative DPO serve as an equivalent proxy for online RL? How do visible reasoning traces relate to actual reasoning capability? Does reasoning fine-tuning reduce a model's ability to abstain appropriately?