Beyond Binary Rewards: Training LMs to Reason About Their Uncertainty

Paper · arXiv 2507.16806 · Published July 22, 2025
Reasoning by Reflection and Self-CritiqueReasoning CritiquesReward ModelsReinforcement Learning

When language models (LMs) are trained via reinforcement learning (RL) to generate natural language “reasoning chains”, their performance improves on a variety of difficult question answering tasks. Today, almost all successful applications of RL for reasoning use binary reward functions that evaluate the correctness of LM outputs. Because such reward functions do not penalize guessing or low-confidence outputs, they often have the unintended side-effect of degrading calibration and increasing the rate at which LMs generate incorrect responses (or “hallucinate”) in other problem domains. This paper describes RLCR (Reinforcement Learning with Calibration Rewards), an approach to training reasoning models that jointly improves accuracy and calibrated confidence estimation. During RLCR, LMs generate both predictions and numerical confidence estimates after reasoning. They are trained to optimize a reward function that augments a binary correctness score with a Brier score—a scoring rule for confidence estimates that incentivizes calibrated prediction. We first prove that this reward function (or any analogous reward function that uses a bounded, proper scoring rule) yields models whose predictions are both accurate and well-calibrated. We next show that across diverse datasets, RLCR substantially improves calibration with no loss in accuracy, on both in-domain and out-of-domain evaluations—outperforming both ordinary RL training and classifiers trained to assign post-hoc confidence scores. While ordinary RL hurts calibration, RLCR improves it. Finally, we demonstrate that verbalized confidence can be leveraged at test time to improve accuracy and calibration via confidence-weighted scaling methods. Our results show that explicitly optimizing for calibration can produce more generally reliable reasoning models.

RLCR provably incentivizes both accuracy and calibration: RRLCR is maximized when models output the answer most likely to be correct, along with a calibrated estimate of their probability of success. In other words, RRLCR is maximized by LM outputs (y, q) for which y maximizes p(1y≡y∗ ), and q = p(1y≡y∗ ). We show that such an objective can be constructed if any bounded, proper scoring rule is used for the calibration term. Notably, while the ubiquitous log-likelihood loss is itself a proper scoring rule, it does not have this property, and can incentivize models to output incorrect answers.

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Why do language models adopt false beliefs even when they possess contradicting knowledge? How can dialogue structure and analysis improve conversational agent performance? Does RLHF training trade accuracy and truthfulness for user satisfaction? How do LLMs' moral reasoning and susceptibility to framing differ from humans? Why do benchmark improvements not always reflect genuine capability gains? Does training for persuasiveness systematically harm factual accuracy? How do language models reason about pragmatics and cooperation unlike humans? Does reflection in reasoning models enable genuine course correction or reinforce initial paths? Why do confidence signals cause humans to overestimate AI reliability? How do AI systems develop self-improvement without external supervision? Can models' internal signals reliably predict reasoning errors? Should benchmarks treat annotation disagreement as signal rather than noise? How can we identify and reduce bias in LLM-based evaluation? How do different reward signals affect what models actually learn? What token-level mechanisms drive language model reasoning generation? Do base models contain latent reasoning that training can unlock? Why does self-revision fail to improve reasoning model accuracy?