The False Promise of Imitating Proprietary LLMs
An emerging method to cheaply improve a weaker language model is to finetune it on outputs from a stronger model, such as a proprietary system like ChatGPT (e.g., Alpaca, Self-Instruct, and others). This approach looks to cheaply imitate the proprietary model’s capabilities using a weaker open-source model. In this work, we critically analyze this approach.... Initially, we were surprised by the output quality of our imitation models—they appear far better at following instructions, and crowd workers rate their outputs as competitive with ChatGPT. However, when conducting more targeted automatic evaluations, we find that imitation models close little to none of the gap from the base LM to ChatGPT on tasks that are not heavily supported in the imitation data. We show that these performance discrepancies may slip past human raters because imitation models are adept at mimicking ChatGPT’s style but not its factuality. Overall, we conclude that model imitation is a false promise: there exists a substantial capabilities gap between open and closed LMs that, with current methods, can only be bridged using an unwieldy amount of imitation data or by using more capable base LMs. In turn, we argue that the highest leverage action for improving open-source models is to tackle the difficult challenge of developing better base LMs, rather than taking the shortcut of imitating proprietary systems.
We were initially surprised by how much imitation models improve over their base models: they are far better at following instructions, and their outputs appear similar to ChatGPT’s. This was further supported by both human and GPT-4 evaluations, where the outputs of our best imitation model were rated as competitive with ChatGPT (e.g., Figure 1, left).
imitation models improve on evaluation tasks that are heavily supported in the imitation training data.
Consequently, we conclude that broadly matching ChatGPT using purely imitation would require (1) a concerted effort to collect enormous imitation datasets and (2) far more diverse and higher quality imitation data than is currently available.
Lines of inquiry this paper opens 24
Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.
Can users accurately assess AI output quality despite polished presentation?- Can audiences learn to distinguish visual polish from analytical substance?
- Can polished presentation authority substitute for actual accuracy in AI outputs?
- What structural features force users to evaluate the epistemic status of outputs?
- Why do users report satisfaction that diverges from actual cognitive clarity?
- What structural evidence shows that polished presentation substitutes for actual thinking in AI output?
- Why does polished AI output exploit reader trust in expert judgment?
- How does AI substitute polished style for actual expert judgment?
- Why does AI-improved task performance fail to transfer to independent work?
- Why do users feel more competent when their actual capability is declining?
- How does unidimensionality in assessments affect measurement validity?
- What distinguishes evaluative stance-taking from the mechanical conformity shape-holding describes?
- How does execution-guided critique differ from abstract action evaluation?
- Why do static evaluators become a constraint on model improvement over time?