Self-consistency Improves Chain Of Thought Reasoning In Language Models
“Although language models have demonstrated remarkable success across a range of NLP tasks, their ability to demonstrate reasoning is often seen as a limitation, which cannot be overcome solely by increasing model scale (Rae et al., 2021; BIG-bench collaboration, 2021, inter alia). In an effort to address this shortcoming, Wei et al. (2022) have proposed chain-of-thought prompting, where a language model is prompted to generate a series of short sentences that mimic the reasoning process a person might employ in solving a task. For example, given the question “If there are 3 cars in the parking lot and 2 more cars arrive, how many cars are in the parking lot?”, instead of directly responding with “5”, a language model would be prompted to respond with the entire chain-of-thought: “There are 3 cars in the parking lot already. 2 more arrive. Now there are 3 + 2 = 5 cars. The answer is 5.”. It has been observed that chain-of-thought prompting significantly improves model performance across a variety of multi-step reasoning tasks (Wei et al., 2022).
In this paper, we introduce a novel decoding strategy called self-consistency to replace the greedy decoding strategy used in chain-of-thought prompting (Wei et al., 2022), that further improves language models’ reasoning performance by a significant margin. Self-consistency leverages the intuition that complex reasoning tasks typically admit multiple reasoning paths that reach a correct answer (Stanovich & West, 2000). The more that deliberate thinking and analysis is required for a problem (Evans, 2010), the greater the diversity of reasoning paths that can recover the answer.
Figure 1 illustrates the self-consistency method with an example. We first prompt the language model with chain-of-thought prompting, then instead of greedily decoding the optimal reasoning path, we propose a “sample-and-marginalize” decoding procedure: we first sample from the language model’s decoder to generate a diverse set of reasoning paths; each reasoning path might lead to a different final answer, so we determine the optimal answer by marginalizing out the sampled reasoning paths to find the most consistent answer in the final answer set. Such an approach is analogous to the human experience that if multiple different ways of thinking lead to the same answer, one has greater confidence that the final answer is correct. Compared to other decoding methods, self-consistency avoids the repetitiveness and local-optimality that plague greedy decoding, while mitigating the stochasticity of a single sampled generation.
Self-consistency is far simpler than prior approaches that either train an additional verifier (Cobbe et al., 2021) or train a re-ranker given additional human annotations to improve generation quality (Thoppilan et al., 2022). Instead, self-consistency is entirely unsupervised, works off-the-shelf with pre-trained language models, requires no additional human annotation, and avoids any additional training, auxiliary models or fine-tuning. Self-consistency also differs from a typical ensemble approach where multiple models are trained and the outputs from each model are aggregated, it acts more like a “self-ensemble” that works on top of a single language model.”
Lines of inquiry this paper opens 24
Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.
Can confidence signals reliably detect flawed reasoning in language models?- Why do fluent predictions fail to capture reliable internal models?
- Does treating model disagreement as belief rather than noise change how we audit outputs?
- How does majority vote consensus handle cases where the consensus is confidently wrong?
- What compute costs does majority-vote consensus sampling add versus supervised training?
- Can crowdsourced voting reliably identify correct answers on graduate-level factual questions?
- What mechanisms let generative models escape collapse through majority voting?
- Why does unsupervised self-distillation lose its advantage in thinking model mode?
- How does distilling only inconsistent rollouts compare to distilling all generations?
- How does learnability at the observer's current state prevent novelty from breaking model reasoning?
- Can applicability conditions and veto rules make self-training stable across substrates?
- What minimum model capability is required before self-improvement bootstrapping can begin?
- Why do preference-optimized AI systems converge on consensus hypotheses instead of exploring alternatives?
- Why does multi-agent debate perform no better than self-consistency?
- Can prompting strategies eliminate systematic biases without shuffling or aggregation?
- What methodological standards should prompting research papers meet before publication?
- How do emotional framing effects in prompts influence model performance?
- Do prompting technique improvements actually replicate in controlled experiments?